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Abstract: Fire management has always meant fire 
 
suppression to the managers of the chaparral 
 
covered southern California National Forests. 
 
Today, Forest Service fire management programs
 
must be cost effective, while wilderness fire 
 
management objectives are aimed at recreating 
 
natural fire regimes. A cost-effectiveness 
 
analysis has been developed to compare fire
 
management options for meeting these objectives in 
 
California's chaparral wilderness. This paper 
 
describes the analytical procedure using examples 
 
from a study currently being conducted for the Los 
 
Padres National Forest, and discusses some 
 
preliminary results. 
 
The southern California National Forests (Los 
 
Padres, Angeles, San Bernardino, and Cleveland) 
 
were originally established to protect the area's 
 
chaparral watersheds from fire, but now bear many
 
additional demands and values. For example, over
 
35 percent of the Los Padres National Forest is
 
designated or proposed wilderness. The goal of
 
fire management in Forest Service wilderness is
 
the restoration and continuance of natural fire 
 
regimes (USDA Forest Service 1986). Fire is a 
 
natural component of chaparral ecosystems. But, 
 
restoring fire's natural role will be difficult 
 
and expensive given past fire suppression policies 
 
and present urban-wildland interface conditions.
 
Forest managers are now charged with restoring
 
this natural fire regime in a cost-effective 
 
manner. 
 
Prescribed lightning fire management, 
 
prescribed burning, and the use of "appropriate 
 
suppression responses" are legal wilderness fire
 
management options (USDA Forest Service 1984).
 
Prescribed lightning fire management is the use of 
 
highly detailed prescriptions to monitor and 
 
manage lightning fires. The prescriptions include 
 
environmental conditions, air quality constraints, 
 
fire and weather histories, limitations on size 
 
and intensity, probability that the fire will 
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remain within acceptable size limits, safety of
 
firefighters and the public, and availability of
 
suppression forces if the fire leaves prescription 
 
and must be suppressed. Prescribed burning is 
 
similar to prescribed lightning fire management 
 
except that Forest Service land managers ignite 
 
the fires on their own time schedule when burning 
 
conditions are optimal (which often means out of
 
the natural fire season). 
 
Any fire not classified as a prescribed fire 
 
is a wildfire and must receive an appropriate 
 
suppression response. But, Forest Service policy
 
no longer requires this response to be intensive
 
suppression efforts aimed at keeping the fire as
 
small as possible (a control response), as a 
 
wildfire can now be contained or confined. 
 
Containment is to surround a fire with minimal
 
control lines and utilize natural barriers to stop 
 
its spread. Confinement is to limit a fire's 
 
spread to a predetermined area principally by the 
 
use of natural barriers, preconstructed barriers, 
 
and environmental conditions (USDA Forest Service 
 
1984). 
 
Southern California Forest managers are 
 
planning to continue intensive suppression efforts 
 
on wildfires and to maintain chaparral wilderness 
 
fire regimes through prescribed burns (USDA Forest 
 
Service 1988). However, appropriate suppression 
 
responses or lightning fire management might be
 
more cost-effective approaches (that is, might
 
reduce the costs and impacts of fire suppression
 
and allow more acres to burn under natural 
 
conditions). This paper has three main 
 
objectives:
 
1. To describe a cost-effectiveness analysis 
 
(CFA) to compare fire management options for 
 
California's chaparral wilderness. 
 
2. To illustrate its use through examples 
 
from a study being undertaken for the San Rafael
 
and Dick Smith Wilderness Areas on the Los Padres 
 
National Forest. 
 
3. To discuss some of the preliminary 
 
3
findings of the Los Padres Analysis.
 
3The Los Padres CEA is currently being
 
conducted through a McIntire Stennis grant from
 
the Natural Resources Management Department at Cal 
 
Poly, San Luis Obispo, and in cooperation with the 
 
Los Padres National Forest. The final results of
 
this CEA will be available by April, 1989 from the 
 
authors. 
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BACKGROUND 
 
Several economic models have been developed to
 
evaluate fire management programs (Saveland 1986; 
 
Mills and Bratten 1982; USDA Forest Service
 
1987). Most of these models are intended for 
 
large-scale fire management planning and cannot 
 
evaluate the effects of anything less than 
 
intensive suppression responses. Furthermore, 
 
many are based on the "cost plus net value change"
 
(C + NVC) economic efficiency criterion. 
 
For example, the National Fire Management 
 
Analysis System (NFMAS--USDA Forest Service 1987) 
 
is used for fire management planning by all
 
National Forests. NFMAS develops fire occurrence
 
probabilities from forestwide fire occurrence 
 
histories, then uses computer models of fire 
 
behavior and suppression efforts to determine 
 
average annual suppression costs and burned areas 
 
for different fire management budget levels and 
 
management emphases (for example, allocating more
 
dollars for fuels management than for suppression 
 
forces or prevention programs). From burned area
 
estimates, net resource value changes caused by
 
fire (NVCs) are calculated based on acreage burned 
 
by intensity level. The budget level and
 
management emphasis which minimizes the sum of
 
fire management costs and NVCs is considered the
 
most efficient. 
 
This type of analysis is inappropriate for 
 
wilderness fire management planning for several 
 
reasons. First, basing fire occurrence rates on
 
large area fire histories misrepresents the fire
 
regime of small, remote wilderness areas. The 
 
greatest cause of fire on the Los Padres is arson,
 
while almost 80 percent of the fires in the Dick
 
Smith and San Rafael Wilderness Areas during the
 
past 25 years were remote lightning-caused fires, 
 
often occurring under less than extreme fire 
 
weather conditions (Los Padres fire reports from
 
1963-87). 
 
Second, expected cost and burned area values 
 
are derived from fire containment computer 
 
programs. Two different programs are available, 
 
but neither is capable of evaluating the effects
 
of any suppression response other than control. 
 
Third, current limitations of Cost + Net Value
 
Change (C + NVC) evaluations make it inadequate 
 
for wilderness fire management planning. C + NVC
 
is a cost-benefit economic efficiency analysis. 
 
Cost-benefit analysis is a comparison of the costs 
 
of meeting an objective against the returns or
 
benefits. In theory, economic efficiency is
 
achieved when the costs equal the benefits, or by
 
the minimization of the sum of the costs and 
 
benifits (as in C + NVC). To be complete, a 
 
cost-benefit analysis must include a measure of
 
all of the costs and all of the benefits (Williams 
 
1973). To define the change in a resource's value 
 
caused by fire, the value of the resource itself
 
must be defined. Currently, C + NVC evaluations 
 
include values for most primary forest resources
 
such as timber, minerals, and forage. Net Value 
 
Changes (NVCs) have also been placed on many 
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wilderness outputs such as water, fish and 
 
wildlife habitat, and recreational use. But, 
 
these resources are only secondary outputs, or
 
by-products of wilderness (Saveland 1986). 
 
Without a measure of the primary value of the 
 
resource--wilderness itself in this case--a
 
cost-benefit analysis will be incomplete, and very 
 
likely misleading (that is, the effects of fire on
 
these by-products is not the same as its effects
 
on a wilderness ecosystem). 
 
Despite these problems, most of the work that 
 
has been done on the economics of wilderness fire
 
is based on C + NVC (Condon 1985, Mills 1985).
 
One exception is an economic evaluation of fire 
 
management options for a portion of the Frank 
 
Church--River of No Return Wilderness Area 
 
(Saveland 1986). This analysis is a 
 
cost-effectiveness comparison of four different 
 
fire management programs. The costs of each
 
alternative are the expected annual suppression 
 
costs. And, "effectiveness" is the approximation
 
of the average "natural" annual burned area based 
 
on what fire history studies reveal:
 
Plant communities require a certain amount of 
 
fire, just as they require a certain amount of 
 
precipitation .... Altering the average annual 
 
burned area would be like altering the average 
 
annual rainfall (Saveland 1986). 
 
Though Saveland's analysis was for a different
 
fire regime, his definitions and much of his 
 
methodology are appropriate for California's 
 
chaparral. 
 
COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
 
A cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), in its
 
truest form, is a comparison of the costs of
 
different alternatives, where each alternative
 
will meet the desired objectives, or have the same 
 
effects. There are five key elements of a CEA: 
 
the objectives; the alternatives; the costs; the
 
model; and a criterion for ranking the 
 
alternatives (Quade 1967). 
 
The Objective
 
The main objective of wilderness fire
 
management is to allow lightning fire to play, as
 
nearly as possible, its natural ecological role in 
 
restoring the natural fire regime. Research
 
suggests that the natural fire return interval for 
 
chaparral is about 30 years (Minnich 1983, Byrne
 
1979). The fire records of the Los Padres 
 
(1911-1987) suggest that the chaparral burns every 
 
45 years (USDA Forest Service 1988). The 45-year
 
rotation was chosen for this study. Using the 45-
 
year return interval, an average of over 5,000
 
acres (2024 ha) of the 231,500 acre (93,687 ha) 
 
study area would have to burn annually. 
 
The Alternatives
 
Four alternatives were chosen for the Los 
 
Padres CEA. Alternative 1 is the Forest Service's 
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past policy: Control all wildfires regardless of
 
cause, and attempt to meet annual burned area 
 
objectives through prescribed burning. 
 
Alternative 2 is the fire management strategy
 
proposed in the Los Padres' Land Management Plan: 
 
Contain all fires which occur under low intensity 
 
and control all moderate to high intensity fires, 
 
while pursuing an active prescribed burning
 
program (USDA Forest Service 1988). Alternative 
 
3: confine all low intensity starts, contain 
 
moderate to high intensity starts, and control
 
only the starts which occur under extreme fire
 
weather conditions. Alternative 4: the same as 3
 
with the addition of an approved plan for 
 
prescribed lightning fire management. 
 
Alternatives 3 and 4 would be augmented by a 
 
smaller prescribed burning program to meet average 
 
annual burned area objectives, since more acres 
 
will have been burned by wildfires and lightning
 
caused prescribed fires.
 
The Costs
 
All measurable variable costs must be included
 
in a CEA. Fixed costs, such as those for staffing 
 
lookouts or firefighting units, do not have to be
 
included in the analysis as long as they remain 
 
the same for each alternative. For example, the 
 
appropriate suppression force staffing levels for 
 
the Los Padres were determined through NFMAS and
 
by budget constraints. These levels are based on
 
an average of over 100 fires per year, while less
 
than 2 fires a year occur in the case study area. 
 
Therefore, wilderness fire suppression strategies 
 
will not affect forestwide personnel 
 
requirements. The variable costs that must be
 
considered are annual suppression costs, NVCs, and 
 
costs of any prescribed burns. 
 
The Model
 
The model is a simplified representation of
 
the real world which includes all of the relevant 
 
features. The role of the model is to predict the 
 
costs of each alternative and the extent to which 
 
each would meet management objectives (Quade 
 
1967). Decision trees can be used to evaluate 
 
alternative fire management programs in the face
 
of uncertainties about future fire occurrences, 
 
weather, behavior, and sizes (Hirsch et al.
 
1981). Decision trees develop expected values,
 
which are probability weighted averages of all
 
possible outcomes. Probabilities are derived from
 
fire history records for fire management
 
planning. Cost and burned area figures can be 
 
drawn from historic fire management records, 
 
records of adjacent or comparable fire management 
 
programs, or some form of fire gaming if no
 
historic or comparable records are available. 
 
Every wildfire is a unique event and past fire
 
occurrences cannot be considered predictors of
 
future fires. Thus, "expected values" are not 
 
predictions (actual future values may or may not
 
be similar), but they do provide relative values
 
for comparison. Therefore, decision trees make an
 
appropriate model for our CEA. 
 
A Criterion
 
The criterion for ranking alternatives is
 
dependent upon the agency's goals and objectives. 
 
In wilderness fire management planning, many 
 
different rankings are possible. Prescribed
 
lightning fire management might be justified even
 
if it was more costly than intensive suppression. 
 
For example, the National Park Service considers
 
acres burned under natural conditions more 
 
important than the cost of a fire management 
 
program (Agee 1985). Both cost and burned area
 
are important considerations for Forest Service 
 
wilderness fire management programs, so both 
 
values must be developed. 
 
THE LOS PADRES EXAMPLE 
 
The decision tree for Alternative 1 of the Los
 
Padres study (table 1) illustrates the values and 
 
probabilities which must be developed for a
 
wilderness fire management CEA. A decision tree 
 
must be completed for each alternative, using the 
 
same probabilities, but with different suppression 
 
responses, and thus different cost and burned area 
 
values. The probabilities for each branch of the
 
trees were calculated from the last 25 year fire
 
history of the San Rafael and Dick Smith
 
Wilderness Areas (including the proposed 16,500 
 
acre--6,680 ha--addition to the San Rafael 
 
Wilderness Area). 
 
For the first branch of the trees, all 44
 
fires (34 lightning- and 10 person-caused fires)
 
were mapped by point of origin. Representative
 
fire locations (R.L.s) were chosen to represent 
 
each historic fire (fig. 1). The probability of a 
 
fire occurring at each R.L. was based on the 
 
number of fires represented by that R.L. For 
 
example, 13 fires are represented by R.L. 1, thus
 
13/44, or 0.296 is the probability of a fire 
 
occurring under conditions represented by R.L. 1.
 
The second branch was the probability of
 
occurrence by cause. These probabilities were 
 
dependent upon the fires represented by that R.L.
 
For example, 5 lightning- and 8 person-caused 
 
fires were represented by location 1, thus the
 
probability of an R.L. 1 fire being caused by 
 
lightning is 5/13, or .385. 
 
For the third branch, the 1400-hr weather 
 
observations from nearby weather stations were
 
retrieved for the day of ignition of each historic 
 
fire and the following 30 days to develop 
 
month-long weather patterns. Weather patterns 
 
were divided into groups, based on the Santa 
 
Barbara Ranger District's prescribed burn weather 
 
parameters: 
 
Low Optimum High 
Fuel stick 
1 hour 8 6 5 
10 hour 14 9 7 
100 hour 18 13 9 
Live fuel moisture 110 70 60 
Relative humidity (pct) 50 30 25 
Wind speed (mi/hr) 0 5 13 
Temperature (degrees F) 60 75 85 
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These parameters represent a window of 
 
environmental conditions which would allow for
 
safe management of a prescribed fire, but still 
 
meet burned area objectives. Environmental 
 
conditions must remain within these parameters
 
throughout the life of a fire for it to still be
 
"in prescription." Prescriptions must be modified 
 
for site specific conditions and burn objectives, 
 
but these general parameters were used to
 
distinguish fires burning under "good" conditions 
 
(low to moderate fire intensity level) and fires
 
burning under "bad" conditions (high to extreme 
 
intensity). Four weather patterns were 
 
distinguished: (A) weather that started within
 
prescription parameters and continued within these 
 
parameters for at least two weeks (a good-good
 
pattern); (B) weather that started within 
 
prescription, but soon moved out of prescription
 
(a good-bad pattern); (C) weather that started 
 
out of prescription, but soon cooled to within
 
prescribed conditions (a bad-good pattern); and 
 
(D) weather that started out of prescription and
 
stayed out (a bad-bad pattern). These patterns
 
were then used to calculate the probability of
 
lightning- and person-caused fires occurring under 
 
each pattern (table 1). For example, 15 of the 34
 
lightning fires occurred under "good-good" weather 
 
patterns so the probability is 0.441. 
 
Once probabilities have been calculated, cost 
 
and burned area values must be developed for 
 
probability weighting. These values should 
 
represent the range of potential fire costs and 
 
sizes. Saveland (1986) used average costs and 
 
sizes drawn from similar fire management programs 
 
on adjacent wilderness lands. To date, no contain 
 
or confine suppression responses, lightning fire
 
management, or prescribed burns have been 
 
Table 1--The decision tree for Alternative 1 of the Los Padres CEA, representing the control of all fires. 
 
1Weather patterns are divided into four groups based on prescribed burn parameters: A = good-good weather 
 
pattern; B = good-bad weather pattern; C = bad-good weather pattern; D = bad-bad weather pattern. 
 
2Suppression response options include: control (CR); contain (CA); confine (CF); or prescribed lightning
 
fire management (Px). 
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attempted in southern California wilderness. 
 
Thus, a fire gaming approach was taken. 
 
Fire gaming is the prediction of
 
representative fire sizes by fire management 
 
professionals. Predictions are based on the
 
interactions of estimated fire behavior conditions 
 
and given suppression force responses (Harrod and 
 
Smith 1983). It is an acceptable technique to 
 
predict final fire sizes and costs, and has been
 
used for Forest Service fire management planning
 
in the past (Joseph and Gardner 1981). Gaming 
 
accuracy is dependent upon the abilities and 
 
knowledge of the fire garners (Harrod and Smith 
 
1983). The Los Padres fire management personnel 
 
participated in fire games for the 1980 National
 
Forest budgeting process. A 1982 fire started 
 
near a gamed location and under similar weather 
 
conditions. The resulting 825-acre (335-ha) fire
 
was very similar in both costs and size to the
 
gamed fire. The same gaming team (as many of the
 
members as possible) was reassembled to game 
 
representative fires for our study. 
 
Fire gamers include the Forest's Fire
 
Management Officer (F.M.O.), the Assistant F.M.O., 
 
the Fuels Management Officer, the recently retired 
 
Fire Prevention Officer ("Budget 80" games 
 
leader), and two District F.M.O.s (one recently 
 
retired). All but the Forest F.M.O. were involved 
 
in the 1980 games so little training was
 
necessary. 
 
Gaming materials include 15-minute topographic
 
maps and aerial photographs of the R.L.s and 
 
adjacent areas, Mylar (clear plastic) overlays, 
 
representative weather patterns (one pattern from
 
each of the four categories was chosen for each 
 
R.L.), a list of the resources that would be
 
dispatched initially to each R.L. (based on the 
 
Forest's current dispatch plan), a fire history 
 
map which includes all fires 300 acres (121 ha) or 
 
greater that occurred in the study area since 
 
records were started, and assorted tabulation 
 
sheets to record resources used, hours, miles of
 
travel, and other suppression costs that would be
 
encountered during the life of each "gamed fire"
 
(Harrod and Smith 1983).
 
Figure 1--The last 25 year fire history of the
 
Dick Smith and San Rafael Wilderness Areas and the 
 
corresponding representative fire locations. 
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Actual games consisted of first mapping an 
 
overlay of the free-burning fire spread (without
 
any suppression efforts) from time of ignition to
 
report and then for a series of time periods 
 
thereafter. Fire spread rates were determined 
 
from the computer program "Firecast" (Cohen 1983) 
 
based on slope and fuel conditions at the R. L.,
 
and the given weather pattern. Spread rates were
 
subjectively modified by garners to account for 
 
changes in fuel conditions, local weather 
 
patterns, diurnal weather changes, and changes in
 
topography as fires spread. Four weather patterns 
 
were gamed at each location. Fires started under
 
"good" weather conditions were then gamed four
 
times: controlled, contained, confined, and
 
managed as a prescribed fire. Fires starting 
 
under "bad" conditions were only controlled and 
 
contained since these fires would be out of
 
prescription, and good weather would be necessary 
 
to confine fires in these unbroken fuelbeds. 
 
PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
 
The results of the fire gaming for R.L. 1 and 
 
some preliminary gaming results for R.L. 2 are
 
presented in table 2. The R.L. 1 values were then
 
run through the appropriate decision tree for 
 
their use and preliminary expected values for 
 
average annual cost and burned area were
 
calculated (table 3). For example, all fires were
 
controlled in Alternative 1, thus the control 
 
gaming results were used throughout this tree 
 
(table 1). Alternative 2 results represent the
 
containment of both fires which started under good 
 
weather conditions and the control of the two 
 
which started under bad conditions. Alternative 3 
 
results represent the confinement of the first two 
 
fires and the containment of the latter two. 
 
Alternative 4 results were calculated similar to
 
the third, except that 25 percent of the low 
 
intensity lightning caused fires (both good
 
conditions) were considered prescribed fires. 
 
Table 3 also compares each alternative's cost 
 
per area managed and average annual cost per 
 
Table 2--Final size and cost figures for gamed fires.
 
Table 3--Average annual cost, cost per area
 
managed, average annual burned area, and average
 
annual cost per area burned for four alternative
 
fire management programs for Representative Fire
 
Location 1 of the Dick Smith and San Rafael
 
1
Wilderness Areas
 
Average 
 
Average annual 
 
Cost per annual cost per 
 
Average acre burned burned 
 
annual (ha) acre acre 
 
cost managed (ha) (ha) 
 
Historical (before 1500+ 
 
suppression) (607+) 
 
Alternative 1 $15,650 $0.23 21.0 $745 
 
($0.57) (8.5) ($1841)
 
Alternative 2 $15,096 $0.22 21.0 $719 
 
($0.55) (8.5) ($1776)
 
Alternative 3 $13,898 $0.20 153.1 $91 
 
($0.50) (62.0) ($224)
 
Alternative 4 $13,908 $0.20 153.1 $91 
 
($0.50) (62.0) ($224)
 
1Representative Fire Location 1 represents 29.6
 
percent of the case study fires, thus figures are 
 
calculated from 29.6 percent of the 231,500 acre
 
(93,687 ha) site, or 68,500 acres (27,722 ha). 
 
burned area for fires represented by R.L. 1. The
 
figures for cost per area managed are based on
 
68,500 acres (27,722 ha), or 29.6 percent of total 
 
wilderness. 
 
NVCs are determined by the size and intensity 
 
level of each gamed fire. The Los Padres
 
currently calculates these values for all 300+
 
acre (121 ha) fires. Only three gamed fires 
 
burned more than 300 acres at R.L. 1 and these
 
were in a "low valued" watershed. Thus, the NVC's 
 
for R.L. 1 do not have much effect on our 
 
preliminary expected annual costs. NVCs will be
 
CONTROL CONTAIN CONFINE Px Lightning Fire 
 
Size Cost Size Cost Size Cost Size Cost 
 
(acres) ($) (acres) ($) (acres) ($) (acres) ($) 
 
Representative fire location 1 
Good-good weather pattern 0.5 6,351 0.5 3,883 4.0 2,919 4.0 3,207 
Good-bad weather pattern 10.0 7,230 10.0 4,365 457.0 6,135 457.0 6,622 
Bad-good weather pattern 118.0 74,942 270.0 45,791 N/G N/G 
Bad-bad weather pattern 40.0 32,238 390.0 39,086 N/G N/G 
Representative fire location 21 
Good-good weather pattern 0.5 2,903 0.5 2,548 99.0 3,038 738.0 28,697 
Good-bad weather pattern 66.7 36,759 780.0 41,367 22300+ 100,000+ 
1Cost figures for representative fire location 2 have not been formally reviewed by the fire garners, thus 
 
they are subject to minor changes. However, the relationships between responses will probably not change. 
 
2The confine fire game for good-bad weather at R.L. 2 has not yet been completed, but the fire will be over
 
2,300 acres and will probably cost over $100,000. The prescribed fire game has not been started.
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important cost considerations when more valuable
 
watersheds become involved. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The values presented in table 3 are only
 
preliminary results as they represent only one
 
R.L. And, R.L. 2 results cannot be run through
 
the decision trees until all of the games for that 
 
R.L. have been completed. The values in table 3 
 
are provided to illustrate calculation techniques 
 
and some of the results that can be developed 
 
through this type of CEA. Expected annual 
 
suppression costs and burned areas will be much 
 
higher when the decision trees are completed, and 
 
the relationships between the alternatives will 
 
probably change. Therefore, comparisons of these
 
preliminary values are difficult to justify since 
 
they are based on such a small database (one 
 
series of games). 
 
Despite this small database, some patterns 
 
have become evident. Many fire management 
 
personnel consider the use of confinement or
 
prescribed lightning fire management impossible in 
 
decadent chaparral fuelbeds (for example, two fire 
 
garners before our games began). Both responses 
 
were successful at R.L. 1 (the least expensive
 
response under good-good weather and only slightly 
 
more expensive than containment under good-bad).
 
This R.L. is covered by fairly young (22-year-old) 
 
mixed chaparral. The relatively light fuels and 
 
extraordinarily high humidities in both good 
 
weather patterns helped confine the fires. This 
 
pattern is not being repeated at R.L. 2, where
 
confinement and prescribed lightning fires are
 
becoming the most expensive responses. These 
 
results suggest that confinement or prescribed
 
lightning fire management will not be cost 
 
effective, at least until much more of these 
 
decadent fuelbeds are broken up by younger fuel 
 
mosaics and our ability to reliably forecast 
 
weather conditions increases. 
 
Containment was feasible under moderate 
 
conditions at R.L. 1 (little more than half of the 
 
cost of control under good-good weather, and the
 
least expensive response under good-bad), and this 
 
pattern is continuing at R.L. 2 (though it was
 
slightly more expensive than control under the
 
moderate intensity, good-bad fire at R.L. 2). 
 
Containment was also the least expensive response 
 
under the highest intensity fire gamed thus far 
 
(bad-good weather at R.L.1), which suggests that
 
containment could provide some substantial fire 
 
suppression savings on fires in these 
 
wildernesses. This pattern will be closely 
 
monitored in future games, as more data will be
 
necessary for validation of this finding. 
 
Expected annual burned areas illustrated the 
 
anticipated pattern of more area burned under the 
 
less intensive suppression responses. The annual
 
expected burned area for alternatives 3 and 4 is
 
somewhat low. But, this can be attributed to the
 
young fuels and high humidities which led to
 
moderate burning conditions. Gamed fire sizes for 
 
confinement and prescribed lightning fires are
 
becoming much higher at R.L. 2, and the higher
 
pattern is probably more representative of these
 
wildernesses. 
 
Some unanticipated, but valuable observations 
 
of these early fire games are not directly related 
 
to our CEA. The garners--all "old-school" 
 
firefighters--originally raised questions about 
 
the feasibility of containing or confining 
 
chaparral fires. Our games compelled these fire 
 
managers to consider what they would do when 
 
required to use these responses in the field, 
 
either through policy or when suppression forces
 
are not available. 
 
Another important finding of our preliminary 
 
games is the value of the Forest's pre-attack 
 
manuals. During the 1960's and early 1970's, the
 
Los Padres was divided into "pre-attack blocks".
 
Each block was mapped, marked, and signs were 
 
posted designating potential dozer lines, hand
 
lines, helispots, water sources, fire camp 
 
locations, and other valuable fire suppression
 
information. These plans have recently been
 
discarded by many fire management staffs, but have 
 
proved invaluable to the garners for the
 
confinement and containment responses. This
 
suggests that if appropriate suppression responses 
 
are ever to be utilized on the Los Padres, these
 
manuals should be updated and made more readily 
 
available to fire management personnel. Even if
 
control remained the most appropriate suppression 
 
response for the Forest, up-dated pre-attack 
 
manuals would be valuable tools for prescribed
 
burn managers. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
In summary, cost-effectiveness analysis is 
 
appropriate for wilderness fire management 
 
planning. Decision trees help us predict future 
 
fire occurrence potentials, and intensive gaming
 
efforts can help us predict fire sizes and costs
 
associated with the implementation of appropriate 
 
suppression responses and prescribed lightning
 
fire management. These values are important to
 
land managers who are now faced with the
 
cost-effective management of natural fire regimes 
 
in chaparral wilderness. This type of analysis is
 
especially valuable for southern California land
 
managers who have little field experience with any 
 
fire management program other than intensive 
 
suppression efforts and off-season prescribed 
 
burning, especially given the risks associated
 
with fire in volatile chaparral ecosystems. Fire
 
games are not only providing a valuable evaluation 
 
of appropriate suppression responses and
 
prescribed lightning fire management, but are also 
 
proving educational to "old school" fire
 
management personnel and illustrating some 
 
potentially cost effective alternatives to 
 
intensive suppression efforts. 
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